In this article, we present an analysis of app behavior before and after the regulatory change in data protection in Europe. Our data shows that app privacy has moderately improved after the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation.
I n May 2018, stronger regulation of the processing of personal data became law in the European Union, known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 1 The expected effect of the regulation was better protection of personal data, increased transparency of collection and processing, and stronger intervention rights of data subjects, with some authors claiming that the GDPR would change the world, or at least that of data protection regulation. 2 The GDPR had a two-year (2016-2018) implementation period that followed four years of preparation. At the time of this writing, in November 2019, one and one-half years have passed since the implementation of GDPR.
Has the GDPR had an effect on consumer software? Has the world of code changed too? Did the GDPR have a measurable effect on mobile apps' behavior? How should such a change in behavior be measured?
In our study, we decided to use two indicators for measurement: Android dangerous permission 16 privileges and user feedback from the Google Play app market. We collected data from smartphones with an installed app set for months before GDPR implementation on 25 May 2018 and months after that date. Figures 1 and 2 show how the data collection was organized. The set of 50 apps in our observation is listed in Figure 3 .
We ran long-term data collection about Android apps' use of permission privileges through the Android operating system permissions mechanism. We focused on the so-called dangerous permissions, 16 a group of access privileges defined as sensitive by Android developers, as they may have an effect on the user's sensitive data that regulate access to location, contacts, phone log, sensors, and other data sources. We monitored app permission access request data in March 2017. To compare, we installed a subset of the post-GDPR versions of the respective apps in December 2018 and ran a one-week data collection campaign, as highlighted in Figures 1 and 3 . The data collection was done with the A-ware data capture tool described in Momen 3 and Momen et al. 4 The data are stored in an online collection database. 5 Figure 2 shows how we collected three types of data from the Google Play server, the app manifest, and apps observed at runtime. Permissions are Android's access-control mechanisms that regulate an app's access to various system resources. To retrieve data protected by dangerous permissions, the app code contains a declaration of the permissions requested by the app programmers in its manifest. Upon the app's first presentation to the operating system, the user of the device is prompted to confirm the permission request. If the user consents, the app stores this granted permission and then can use it without user interaction to access resources. Apps do not face any restriction in terms of the period, frequency, or amount of data extracted, except for in the Android 9.0 Pie version, which has introduced some granular conditions for permission access. The permission declaration in the app is, therefore, an indication of the app's likely data access (however, there may be effects that obfuscate this interpretation; see the "Limitations of Chosen Approach" section). To evaluate the extent of access, we logged and archived app permission use at the operating system level with the A-ware logging tool. The logs were collected for further analysis. From them, we obtained data about the app's actual usage of its permissions. Figure 1 . Data were collected with an approximately six-month quarantine before and after GDPR implementation. App manifest data (list of required permissions) and user concern data (retrieved from Google Play's server) were collected after app permission-use profiling. Quarantining ensured that app producers had time to adapt apps to GDPR between the two data collection periods. t: time. Figure 2 . An overview of the data collection methods used. App manifest data and user concern data were retrieved from Google Play's server, respectively extracted from app manifests and the user feedback forum. App use data were observed with the A-ware tool installed on smartphones. GoogleFit (21) weather.com (20) Accuweather (19) WeatherApp (18) GoWeather (17) WeatherBug (16) Weather&Clock (15) YahooWeather (14) PalmaryWeather (13) Yr (12) Weather&Radar (11) Spotify (10) SoundCloud (9) Shazam (8) Tidal (7) SongFlip (6) BBCiPlayer (5) Deezer (4) Play Music (3) JangoRadio (2) iHeartRadio (1) Telegram ( GoogleFit (21) weather.com (20) Accuweather (19) WeatherApp (18) GoWeather (17) WeatherBug (16) Weather&Clock (15) YahooWeather (14) PalmaryWeather (13) Yr (12) Weather&Radar (11) Spotify (10) SoundCloud (9) Shazam (8) Tidal (7) SongFlip (6) BBCiPlayer (5) Deezer (4) Play Music (3) JangoRadio (2) iHeartRadio ( User feedback is the second indicator of app change. Such feedback sometimes comprises valuable information regarding different aspects of apps, ranging from user-friendliness to privacy features. Thus, based on our previous study, 6 we collected user reviews of the 50 most-downloaded apps within five app sets on the Google Play market-121,991 and 130,065 reviews from the preand post-GDPR periods, respectively. We then applied natural language processing and machine-learning (ML) techniques to collected user reviews, focusing on vocabulary referring to privacy threats. The resulting sets of threats for the two data collection periods are indicators of end users' concerns and experiences before and after the adoption of the GDPR. Before focusing on the data analysis, we discuss the expected impact of the GDPR on apps and their permissions use.
Permissions and the GDPR
One would expect that many of the aspects of GDPR are now implemented, and this should show in the app code. Such expectations should be reflected in the software because of the enforcement of expensive violation sanctions. Mobile apps, in particular, have been known to extract large amounts of personal data. 7, 8 In theory, the observed data collection and processing behavior of apps should have adapted to the GDPR by improved privacy statements and consent collection interfaces and/or through software updates that changed functionality. We targeted functionality when we measured permissions usage.
The GDPR places various requirements on personal data collection and processing. Some of these requirements are discussed next.
The principle of purpose specification requires any processing of personal data to be bound to a declared purpose. Article 5-1(b) of the GDPR states that personal data shall be 1 collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89 (1) , not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes ("purpose limitation").
The choice of requested permissions should, therefore, correlate to the app functionality and the privacy policy. Moreover, the use of permissions should be bound to its purpose-for example, the MICROPHONE permission can be used for purpose A only, not for purpose B.
The principle of data minimization requires personal data processing to be reduced to the minimum amount necessary to fulfill the app's purpose. Article 5-1(c) of the GDPR states that personal data shall be "adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed ('data minimization'). " 1 Thus, the use of permissions should be restricted to the minimum needed to deliver a transaction with the app.
The principle of transparency requires all personal data processing to be clearly transparent to the data subject. Article 5-1(a) of the GDPR states that personal data shall be "processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject ('lawfulness, fairness, and transparency'). " 1 For permissions, transparency means that information about the kind of data accessed, the frequency, and the amount of data extracted should be available. Currently, only one-stop consent for any amount of permission-based access is provided.
Data protection by design is a principle that requires apps to respect privacy from the start, with safe configurations and minimum necessary data processing. Article 25-2 of the GDPR highlights the requirement: 1 The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons.
The implications for permission use are that the minimum number of permissions should be requested, and a lower number of actual permissions should be used in such ways that they reduce the loss of personal data by default.
Data protection impact assessment, which is mandatory for high-risk or high-magnitude data processing or handling of sensitive personal data, may uncover risks for data subject privacy. Article 35-7(a-d) of the GDPR elaborates on the criteria: 1
The assessment shall contain at least: (a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest pursued by the controller; (b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to the purposes; (c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects referred to in paragraph 1 (Art. 35-1); and (d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons concerned.
GDPR compliance activities may uncover such risks materializing as a consequence of excessively broad or deep permissions use in apps. Consequently, risk reduction will decrease the number of permissions consumed and shown.
Freely given and unambiguous data subject consent is a precondition for lawful data processing. Article 7-2 of the GDPR emphasizes this aspect: 1 If the data subjects' consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding.
Freely given consent requires permission to access data to be bound to a declared purpose, confirmed by the data subject through consent. Therefore, one can expect post-GDPR apps to change behavior so that permissions will not be confirmed in bulk from the start but in more selective and interactive ways.
The right to withdraw consent is also an important right for implementing individual privacy preferences. Historically, an app would just show permissions with a binary (accept/decline) consent collection form to the data subject; this was addressed in newer Android versions (6.0-9.0). Now, the right to withdraw consent is preserved in these versions, and therefore, they comply with Article 7-3: 1
The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.
However, the spirit of freely given and revocable consent is yet to be fully captured, because there is no permission usage monitoring mechanism in the user interface. Such unavailability could influence individual decisions on consents given earlier. Thus, permission usage monitoring efforts can potentially support informed decision making.
Software changes in reaction to the new regulation are hard to predict, however. While it has recently been argued that the inertia of regulation adoption that is caused by national exceptions and local adoption of EU data protection traditions predating the GDPR, 2 we believe that the threat of fines and public exposure actually has created a momentum to improve software, at least when provided by professional software firms or service providers. However, another argument is presented in Wagner: 9 the reaction of software vendors to regulation may not always be in support of regulation. As software can be updated very quickly, and standard practices can be established more quickly than new regulations can be enforced, there is a risk that software may intentionally use loopholes, camouflage its compliance with regulation, and pursue its own agenda.
Expecting Changes in Apps
Based on our discussion of potential GDPR effects on software behavior, we formulate these hypotheses: ■ H1. Reduced permission declaration: Code should have been cleaned up and data collection minimized, which should be visible in a reduced number of dangerous permissions declared. ■ H2. Reduced permission use: A lower permission use frequency should occur. As the user provides consent in a granular fashion, permissions should be used more selectively, based on apps' real functionality. ■ H3. Reduced user concern: User feedback should consequently show reduced worries about privacy threats.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the collected data, we discuss the constraints and limitations of our data collection project.
Limitations of Chosen Approach
Several difficulties arise when interpreting the intention and the relevance of permission use in apps. While our captured data measure static permission declaration and actual use during runtime, it will be difficult to estimate the reasons for and intentions behind the particular permission use. Therefore, not all permission uses may relate to an actual privacy risk.
Simple programming issues, such as reused code asking for too many permissions or code that has not been cleaned up from testing, could affect our measurements. Program libraries have been observed as a possible source for excessive use of permissions. In Book et al., 10 a growing consumption of permissions is identified that is imported through advertising libraries. The intentions of the app programmers and the library programmers may diverge in some cases. For the interpretation of permission use before and after the GDPR, we can only speculate about the possibility that permission-hungry libraries had actually been removed from the app code, since there is not an updated survey for Book et al. 10 available. In addition, our data were collected on idle smartphones that were not actively used, thus we measured only the app activity that took place without user interaction. In later experiments with app interaction, we got the impression that some apps will collect approval for permission use after a certain time period or if certain conditions occur. Possibly, permissions have not yet been asked for by idling apps.
We point out that while we measured apps showing their permissions credentials to the operating system, we did not observe whether they accessed or collected data. Neither did we consider personal information extraction, transfer to connected online servers, or processing done at such servers.
There are practical limitations to data captured with respect to the control of context variables. Many apps are highly interactive. Social media and news-related apps as well as advertising are controlled by external activities. Apps may be updated during data collection, thus automatic updating has to be turned off during the measurement. However, Google Play enforces updates after a while, which limits measurement campaigns to shorter periods. Our app sample was, for the sake of stable conditions, installed to the devices, activated, and, if necessary, personalized with an artificial account. The apps were then left as they were and measured with no user interaction. Through this, we aimed to exclude interaction bias and the influence of social network activities, which both may change app behavior.
For user-review analysis, we implemented and followed an ML-based scheme to mine user reviews to find privacy-related complaints. It is important to note that the overall usefulness of such a technique is dependent on 1) how well it understands the user reviews and 2) the level of truthfulness of those user reviews. Our approach mainly covers the former, and there is little discussion of the accuracy, veracity, and clarity of the reviews, because this is generally out of our control.
We would like to highlight that performing a comprehensive app-privacy analysis for both the pre-and post-GDPR periods is not an easy task. This is mainly because of the lack of historic app data (manifest, permission usage, and user reviews), which are not fully available for the pre-GDPR period. However, we were able to partially correlate our app data sets obtained from separate studies conducted by two research groups (in Sweden and Germany). Nevertheless, we would like to emphasize that there is a mismatch between the studied app categories in the user-review analysis and app permission-usage analysis (only the Health and Fitness and Music and Audio app categories overlap).
Reproducibility is difficult in this setting. Apps get updated, often several times per week. Most apps receive messages from their background services that impact their behavior. Thus, it is challenging to recreate the exact same test setting.
The app set's composition also has an impact on the result. The current app set is mainly taken from the globally most-downloaded apps on the Google Play market. Those apps reflect a global, English-speaking consumer community, with an expected over-representation of English-speaking countries. Therefore, the data may contain an implicit bias toward non-EU privacy regulation and attitudes. A focused data set representing apps from European vendors available in EU languages may show different results. We also acknowledge that the chosen app set for permission analysis is a very small subset of the millions available in various markets. However, it is plausible to assume that choosing globally popular apps allows correlation of privacy expectations of a vast user base and with industry-standard practice.
Changes in Permission Declaration and Usage Patterns
App developers are required to define permissions needed for their apps to function in the app permission manifest. Based on the permission request level, 17 users have to consent to data access by granting or rejecting permission requests. Therefore, our study looks for the changes in the developers' permission declarations before and after the adoption of the GDPR. Previous studies showed that app developers usually request more permissions than needed for the proper functionality of their apps. 3, 7, 8, 11 The number of declared permissions has historically risen over time. 10 We can examine hypothesis H1 by comparing the extent to which the GDPR had a measurable effect on the permissions requested in the app manifest.
Permissions: Manifest Changes
This section investigates hypothesis H1. We collected the permission manifest for the 50 most-used apps across five app categories on the Google Play market in November 2017. Our analysis mainly focuses on those permissions defined by Android as dangerous permission requests. Figure 3 (a) visualizes the results for both the pre-and post-GDPR periods. The quantification of app permission requests is based on a three-level indicator.
A reduction of dangerous permission declarations can be observed. In total, we observe fewer dangerous permission requests in 44 incidents. For an overview, Figure 3 (a) shows how individual apps have increased and decreased their permission declarations. Moreover, this was confirmed in total changes shown in Figure 4 (a), where the reductions in permission declarations are shown as blue columns. An app category that has the tallest reduction bar has a lower data access potential, and thus may be considered more privacy friendly. All app groups show a reduction of permission declarations after the adoption of the GDPR.
With respect to category, visualization of change in permission declarations is shown in Figure 3(a) , which depicts that weather forecasting-related apps show significant improvement in terms of requesting fewer dangerous permissions, namely PHONE (six incidents), CONTACTS (five incidents), and CALENDAR (four incidents). Interestingly, this was also confirmed in permission usage changes shown in Figure 3 Although the privacy performance of Fitness apps is better than that of Social or Communication apps in terms of permission manifest changes, all three categories were assigned similar delta values for permission usage changes.
Our analysis shows that apps are less permission hungry when it comes to requesting the permissions CALENDAR, SMS, PHONE, CONTACTS, and LO-CATION. However, some permissions were requested more frequently in the post-GDPR period: CAMERA (four incidents), MICROPHONE (three incidents), and SENSORS (one incident).
Permissions: Changes in Use
To investigate hypothesis H2, we monitored apps' use of dangerous permissions at runtime. The first phase of the data collection campaign was in March 2017, which is referred to as the pre-GDPR period. We carried out the second phase in December 2018, and it represents the post-GDPR period. In this section, we discuss the changes and other notable observations between the two collected data sets.
In the pre-GDPR phase, apps showed dangerous permissions more frequently while idling than would be expected. 4, 12 We monitored several sets of popular apps from different categories and their permission access patterns while keeping the devices idle (without user interaction). The apps were installed on several devices that had a preconfigured prototype app (A-ware) installed to record application programming interface access from the operating system. The collected logs were then analyzed to determine apps' permission access patterns. Recently, we repeated the same experiment with a post-GDPR app set installation.
The post-GDPR phase faced several obstacles, including keeping the catalyst parameters for data collection intact and finding an app set that matched the corresponding data sets from studies conducted independently in two locations (Sweden and Germany). To reproduce the earlier collection context and keep other influencing parameters constant, none of the apps were actively used after installation. We collected logs of their permission access patterns. Figure 3 shows a correlation visualization of the permission data. Figure 3 shows a comparison of the pre-GDPR and post-GDPR permission usage data. The following changes in patterns can be observed: ■ In general, the frequent presence of green fields in Figure 3 indicates that many apps reduced their permission access counts compared to the pre-GDPR phase. ■ Considering the area between K11 and T20, Weather apps significantly reduced permission access, with YahooWeather (14) showing the most significant improvement. The area between O14 and O20 also shows reductions, as do rows 8, 14, and 21. ■ Music apps also reduced permission access during idle time, with one notable exception: GooglePlay-Music (3), in K3-T3, increased access to SENSORS and STORAGE while reducing access to the rest of the permission groups. ■ Columns R and T indicate the overall increment in accessing SENSORS and STORAGE permissions. Fitness, Communication, and Social apps are mainly responsible for this increase. ■ Column O highlights the overall reduction of access to the LOCATION permission group with two exceptions: Fitness and Social apps increased access frequency. ■ Line (43), WeChat (44), Imo (45), Runtastic (28), and Pedometer (29) are the five apps that increased idle time permission access frequency compared to the pre-GDPR period.
Some noteworthy observations can be made by comparing Figure 3 
Changes in Expressed User Concerns
We collected a large number of user reviews from the Google Play app market for both the pre-and post-GDPR periods. 6 Applying text-classification techniques, the goal was to investigate how many privacy-related concerns could be extracted from publicly available user reviews that would ultimately enable us to compare users' attitudes toward apps from both time frames. Thus, this section examines hypothesis H3. Based on the mobile app threat categorization in Hatamian et al. (2019), 6 we processed, analyzed, and classified the collected user reviews (in 2017 November, before the adoption of the GDPR) associated with the top 50 most-downloaded apps within five app categories on the Google Play market. As depicted in Figure 5 , we detected 799 privacy complaints concerning our app sets. When it comes to the most frequently reported threats, Targeted Ads, Spam, and General have the greatest numbers, with 389, 136, and 105 complaints, respectively. It is worth mentioning that the General category contains mostly complaints regarding overprivileged (permission-hungry) apps that were requesting permissions not relevant to their proper functionality. By contrast, Tracking and Spyware, Phishing, and Unintended Data Disclosure garnered the lowest number of complaints (16, 21 , and 37 user reviews, respectively). In terms of the most-and the least-reported app categories, we refer to Lifestyle (255 complaints) and Music and Audio (120 complaints). Both categories had Targeted Ads as the most-reported threat. However, for the Lifestyle category, the second most-reported threat was Spam (62 complaints), and for Music and Audio it was Unauthorized Charges (30 complaints).
In February 2019, we collected a new data set of user reviews corresponding to the same app set to check the privacy perceptions of mobile users after the GDPR went into effect. Overall, a decent reduction can be observed in the total number of privacy relevant complaints (from 799 to 704). As for the most-reported threat, as in the pre-GDPR period, it involves complaints about Targeted Ads (347). In contrast to the pre-GDPR period, the General category takes second place with 130 complaints. The third most-reported threat is Spam (97 complaints). The same scenario is repeated for the least-reported threats in the post-GDPR period with some permutations: Phishing (13 complaints), Unintended Data Disclosure (27 complaints), and Tracking and Spyware (27 complaints). In terms of the app category with the maximum number of privacy complaints, Lifestyle still dominates (165 complaints). In contrast to the pre-GDPR period, when Music and Audio had the lowest number of privacy-related complaints, this time it has the third-greatest number (150 complaints). The lowest number of privacy-related complaints this time is found in Health and Fitness (113 complaints).
Discussion of Observations
We see an overall reduction in all three data sets that were collected during the post-GDPR period:
■ The declared intent to use permissions declined, as shown in a general reduction in the number of permissions declared in the manifest data. ■ There are substantially fewer permissions shown in the post-GDPR data set that measured idling apps, although some permissions are being used more often. ■ User concern expressed in the Google Play forum has somewhat decreased for all app categories, except for worries about targeted advertising and general security concerns.
It is difficult to correlate the observed phenomena directly with the GDPR. In this section, we interpret the results to find potential causes and explanations.
As shown in Figures 2 and 4 , there is a significant reduction in the number of permissions used by apps. At first glance, we observe that the data minimization principle may be more strongly followed by app developers in the post-GDPR period. Such improvement in data minimization is also directly connected to the purpose specification principle, as it requires developers to clarify the need for requesting relevant permissions. As an important observation, we found that apps are greedier in requesting sensor-related permissions (CAMERA, MICRO-PHONE, and BODY_SENSOR) in the post-GDPR period. Our explanation is that access to other permissions (CONTACTS, LOCATION, and MICROPHONE) may have become conditional and is triggered by motion sensors using SENSORS. When there are changes in SENSORS data, other permissions can be invoked. We plan to investigate this phenomenon in future experiments. A possible explanation for this may be the fact that advertising content is shown more effectively when users actually look at the screen. Consequently, apps may use the sensors for motion, acceleration, and bearing to determine when to show advertisements. Increasing interest in user location may express an increased trend toward location-aware advertising.
We see a large number of declared permissions remaining unused, particularly in the Communications and Social apps categories. What does this imply? This might point to sleeping functionality that is not used in idling apps and could indicate that some apps deploy continuous and invasive tactics to harvest more data (that is, progressively collecting consent for dangerous permissions after a period of interaction). Such tactics have been observed and described in the literature. 13, 14 However, it is hard to judge whether this is the result of data minimization work or of malicious intent. To clarify this, a further study will have to document apps' efforts to collect partial consent in ways similar to those documented in a report about nudging users toward less privacy. 15 The significant reduction of permission declaration and use in the weather app group is best explained by a large amount of press and media attention spent on Weather apps that extract personal data. From 2017 to 2019, there were frequent press stories in, for example, The Times, The Wall Street Journal, and PC World, that exposed Weather apps' greedy data-collection and sharing practices. Such massive negative publicity may have led to the reengineering of the Weather apps for the simple reason of preventing further negative public exposure.
The reduction of apps' interest in the PHONE and SMS permissions (see the "Permissions: Changes in Use" section) may provide slightly more privacy for those who use those communication channels, but the decrease may also point to a general decline in these channels' popularity and relevance. A decline in telecom operators' text-messaging profits caused by chat and messenger software is a well-established observation, with SMS revenue dropping for the first time in 2014. The user feedback shows a descending trend in the total number of concerns voiced from the pre-to post-GDPR periods. This is a somewhat puzzling fact, since most of the global user population must have received a multitude of GDPR compliance messages, seen media and press coverage about "spy apps," and read news about major data breaches. All these should increase the attention, awareness, and wariness of consumers. However, it seems that the expressed user concern actually declined. This is evident for the Lifestyle category, as the total number of privacy-related complaints decreased by 90. In two cases, however, we observed a gentle increase in the total number of users' complaints: namely, the Business and the Music and Audio categories. Both categories target users' general interests and are supposed to give certain relevant functionalities. A closer look at the Business category shows a significant increase in the reporting of General threats in the post-GDPR period (almost twice as many). The same also happened to Music and Audio, where Targeted Ads were reported more than twice as often in the post-GDPR period.
A probable cause remains unexplored in this article: the possibility of formal channels established by companies to handle individual privacy-related complaints from the user. Therefore, the reduction of user complaints in public forums may not be able to adjudicate proper assessment of the real situation. Furthermore, implementation of the GDPR has compelled many companies to provide several privacy notices and transparent services to the data subject (that is, the ability to see, download, and modify data stored by the corresponding service provider), which may cause the user to be annoyed and reluctant in this regard.
One possible interpretation of this result is the capacity and effect of software to establish de facto laws and principles, ignoring or bypassing regulation (see Wagner, p. 466). 9 The practices of the information industry may have constituted a precedent widely accepted by consumers, in spite of regulation. Another interpretation is that consumers may not really notice the subtle changes in post-GDPR app behavior. Previous research in humancomputer interaction has shown that the permission-based access-control models' consequences and implications are mostly incomprehensible to end users, 11 who seldom have first-hand experience with negative privacy impacts. I n our data, we have seen changes in app behavior and in user feedback that point toward the positive impact of the GDPR on apps. The number of permissions demanded in app manifests has somewhat declined (H1 confirmed), with the strongest decline in the weather app group. Idling apps seem to use fewer of the permissions than they are actually prepared to use, with observed reductions in permission use (H2 confirmed). In user feedback, a moderate decline in concerns related to privacy can be seen, although awareness and worries about targeted advertising seem to have increased. This is an overall confirmation of H3.
Apps seem to have become more interested in sensor data and location as well as memory access. However, they still have the capacity to use other dangerous permissions and may just not yet use them while the app lacks the expected degree of interaction.
We speculated about reasons for our observations in the "Discussion of Observations" section. Some apps may have undergone reengineering for better privacy. Other apps may have moved their use of certain permissions to times when there is interaction with users and apps are actively being used, measurable by sensor input. Our findings are inconclusive concerning our expectation that regulatory compliance would show in app behavior and experience. The user feedback results show that consumers seem the most worried about targeted advertising, both before and after the GDPR came into effect.
It is possible that the compliance process has not led to a reduction in the number of permissions used, but it may have changed privacy policies and the ways in which permission consent is obtained from the app users. Overall, we conclude that app privacy has moderately improved since the GDPR was implemented.
